Econ 802 Lecture Notes on Chapter 3

Sept. 28, 2020 Greg Dow This chapter deals with the properties of The profit function. [Note: I will not discuss the envelope Meanen or the Lechotehen Principle, but you should need what For This topic Varien uses Re notation Various says about Them. T(p) = max p.y For the sake of variety I will askine a single apput use The production function and use The notation TT(pw) = max {pf(x) - w.x} where p >0 15 a scalar atput price and we (m, -... Wn) >0 15 a vector of input prices. There are four properties a profit function always has. I will state each property and briefly explain why 1) Non-decreasing in p and non-increasing in w. It should be obvious that T/p w) cannot decrease when prises. The firm always has the gotion of continuing to use the same input vector x as before, Since f(x) 20 and w is not changing profit connet full and it fas so it will rise, Of course The firm may find it aptimal to adjust x after p changes if 50, profit may increase even more.

The second part of The statement is less chuias. Here is a guick proof. Let w' = wo with strict Inequality for at least one input i. Let x' be aptimal for w' and let x be optimal for los. 1 pf(x1) - w'x' < pf(x1) - wx' < pf(x6) - wxe Tr(p,w') because because x° 15 V
w' 2 wo optimal for we Tr(pw') This shows That TIPE W) & TIPE WO) & Linearly homogeneous in (p, w) We need to prove that IT (tptw) = t IT (pw), fort >0. Let's write This out in details

IT (tp,tw) = max {(tp)f(x) - (tw) x} = t max {pf(x) - wx} = t TT(pw), The key step is The transition from The first line to The second line where we move to cutside the max operation. This is justified because The same x is optimal regardless of whether we are maximizing pf(x) - wx or t [pf(x) - wx]. (it doesn't matter whatler we multiply the objective function by a positive constant, whatever was estimate before is still optimal). 3) Convexity in (p, u) I won't do a full proof, but here is an argument That should clarify what is going as,



Pick some arbitrary prices (p* w*). Let x* be optimal at Nese prices and let y* = f(x*) be The resulting output. The resulting profit is TT* = p*y* - w*x*. Now keep w* fixed and consider variations in To output price p. One option The firm always has is to stay at (y* x*). If it does it gets The profit TT = py* - w*x* which is linear in p (note That p = 0 implies TT = - w*x* which

 $T = py - u \times v$ (slope = y + v) $T = \pi(p^*u^*) - - - - v$ p^*

However when $p \neq p^*$ The firm might be able to increase its profit by re-optimizing (chaosing some offer x rather Than continuing with x*). Thus the value of The profit function T(p,w) may be above the straight line shown in the graph. (Note: T(o,w) = 0 because the firm cannot get any revenue when p = 0 and sets x = 0.) This argument is true both for $p = p^*$ and $p > p^*$ so in general the true function $T(p,w^*)$ is above the line and they meet only at p^* . This is the graphical interpretation of the convexity of T(p,w) as a function of the output price. Mathematically we can show that T(p,w) is a convex function of the entire price vector (p,w). The proof is not difficult (see Varian).

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(4) Continuity in (p, w) when pro wro.

The proof comes from the Theorem of the Maximum which is in chapter 27 of Varion,

Hotelling's Lemma

An important fact about The profit function is
That you can differentiate it to obtain at put
supply and imput demand functions (assuming of
course That it is differentiable). This involves
Hatelling's Lemma which I will first state
and Then prove.

Statement of Re Lemma:

Let y(p, w) be The firm's atput supply function, Let x. (p, w) be The firm's (unconditional) demand function for imput i.

Then y(pu) = dT(pu)

 $\chi_{i}(\rho, \omega) = -\partial \pi(\rho, \omega) \qquad \hat{i} = 1 - \epsilon \eta$

as lang as the derivatives exist ad pro wro.

Note: don't forgot To negative sign for Xi (pu).
In general TT (pu) fells when we increases so
it you leave at the negative sign you will get
a negative imput demand, which makes no
sense in This context (we are using notative
where X Z a so input levels are ron-negative)



Proof of Hotelling's Lemnas suppose The prices are (pt wt) and The quantities (yt, xx) maximize profit at these prices. Define The function 9(pw) = T(pw) - [py*-wx*] 20 This is non-negative because for arbitrary prices (pw) The production plan (yt, xt) is not necessarily aptimal, and The maximum profit T(QW) is at least as large as what the firm rould got from (y* x*) However we must have g(p* w) = 0 because of Plese perticular prices (y* x*) is optimal, so TT (p+ w+) = p+y+ - w+x* This suplies that g(p, w) reaches a minimum at (p+, w+) and Meretare must satisfy The first eviden conditions for a minimum at These prices. The + OC are $\frac{\partial g(p^*, w^*)}{\partial p} = \frac{\partial \pi(p^*, w^*)}{\partial p} - y^* = 0$ $\frac{\partial g(p^*, w^*)}{\partial w_i} = \frac{\partial \pi(p^*, w^*)}{\partial w_i} + x_i^* = 0, \quad i = loon$ Since (pt wt) was chosen arbitrarily This is true for any prices you want to see ad we can remove The stars. The result is y(gw) = dT(gw)

as Claimed.

Xi(Qu) = - STI(Qu)



Hotelling's Lemma 13 often useful in Theaetical work. It can also be useful empirically. For example it you have date an price, and profits (but not quentities) maybe you can estimate The profit function T(p, w). If se you can use Hotelling to compute The output supply and imput demand functions That describe The form's behavior. Comparative Statics The Easy Way (Duality) Back in chapter 2 we studied two methods for doing comparative statics with a competitive firm: The FOR method and The algebraic method. Now I will talk about a Third methode besep an Hotelling's Lemma often called the duelity method, Coven Hotelling's Lamma we can write The Hessian of The profit function as follows: $\frac{\partial^2 \Pi}{\partial \rho^2} = \frac{\partial^2 \Pi}{\partial \rho^2} \cdot \frac{\partial^2 \Pi}{\partial \rho \partial \nu} \cdot \frac{\partial^2 \Pi}{\partial \rho \partial \nu}$ Dendp du,2 22TT Dundpl 9 2 11 Dwn 2 Where dy Hascalor Dy BIXN - dx y Dr NXI and DX IX NXN

Because st(p, w) is convex in (p, w) T has a positive semi-definite Hession. Firthermore, the Hession is symmetric.

Therefore we get symmetric cross-price effects

where $\frac{\partial x_i}{\partial w_i} = \frac{\partial x_j}{\partial w_i}$ for all i = 1 - m $\frac{\partial y}{\partial w_i} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{2$

From pos. semi definiteness the diagonal elements

must be nonnegative which implies

dy 20 od -dxi 20 fer all i = 1-my

or dxi 20 for all i.

This shows that The firm's atput supply arme count stope down and its unconditional input demand curves cannot slope up.

A key point here is that we did not have to invert a matrix to get There results (unlike The mothed involving FOCs in Chapter 2). So The duality method works even if we can't vie The implicit function Theorem because the sufficient socs do not hold. The price we pay in that we don't set equally strong results — we get weak inequalities rather than strict ones.

Also note that The algebraic method is more general (it works even without differentiability). But it we can take derivatives the duality approach

That's all for chapter 3! provides more information.